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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis seeks to answer the question: Why has Japan’s immigration policy 
been restrictive? The research will explore the factors that influence Japan’s immigration 
policy. Specifically, it will examine Japan’s restrictive immigration strategy and the 
resulting immigration patterns. It seeks to answer why Japan’s immigration policy has 
remained relatively restrictive (closed) despite external factors pressuring it to open up 
(i.e., the country’s increased need for foreign labor due, in part, to a stagnating economy 
and a rapidly aging population). This thesis acknowledges that more recent developments 
in Japanese immigration policy seem to point to a new, more open policy direction, but 
contends that it remains too early to say whether this demonstrates a significant policy 
shift or is simply an anomaly. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: Why has Japan’s immigration policy been 
restrictive?  The resulting research explores the factors that influence Japan’s immigration 
policy.  Specifically, the thesis examines Japan’s restrictive immigration strategy and the 
resulting immigration patterns. It seeks to answer why Japan’s immigration policy has 
remained relatively restrictive (closed) despite external factors pressuring it to open up; or 
example, the country’s increased need for foreign labor due, in part, to a stagnating 
economy and a rapidly aging population. This thesis acknowledges that more recent 
developments in Japanese immigration policy seem to point to a new, more open policy 
direction, but contends that it remains too early to say whether this demonstrates a 
significant policy shift or is simply an anomaly. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
As its major political, economic, and military ally, the United States has significant 
interest in Japan, including in its economic prospects. Japan, previously the economic 
powerhouse in Asia, has been facing a prolonged economic stagnation. Japan’s declining 
and aging population has exacerbated this economic situation, drastically reducing the 
available workforce within the economy. Japan’s population had already started declining 
in 2015; it is projected that its population in 2050 will be reduced from 127 million to 100 
million, a reduction of 23%.1  With this decline, a power vacuum will result in a more 
economically powerful China. Already China flexes its significant economic power 
throughout the region; it is able to influence bilateral and multilateral economic 
agreements, and much of the East Asian countries’ GDPs are dependent on China as a trade 
 
1 Roger Goodman, and S Harper, “Japan in the New Global Demography: Comparative Perspectives,” 
The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus vol. 5, issue 7 (July 2007): 1, https://apjjf.org/-Roger-
Goodman/2472/article.html. 
2 
partner.2  This shift in the balance of powers in Asia continue to impact the United States’ 
interests in the region. 
Additionally, Japan’s population decline and prescription for adaptive immigration 
policy is a common trend that many developed countries (including the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and many European countries) face today. It would be helpful to 
observe other countries’ response to the immigration challenge and the resulting economic, 
political and cultural implications. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to answer what drives the development of Japan’s immigration policy, it 
is necessary not only to examine the specific actors that set, influence, and change 
immigration policy, but also to understand the underlying theories that influence 
immigration policy discourse. This thesis conducts an overview of the different migration 
theories. Understanding the reasons why people immigrate to another country brings us 
close to understanding how policies are developed to shape this movement. The thesis also 
surveys the different migration policy theories. These theories help answer the question, 
“What drives state migration policies?” and should be directly applicable to the Japan case 
study. In later chapters, this thesis reviews Japan’s Immigration history from the 1980s to 
present day. It also demonstrates the overall immigration patterns in the country, what the 
dominant policies were, and what drove the policy formation. 
1. Migration Theories 
What drives people to immigrate from one country to another?  A number of these 
theories use economic rationales for initial migration. In the neoclassical economic theory, 
alternatively called the push-pull  or “rational choice” theory, the initial movement results 
 
2 Robert S. Ross, “On the Fungibility of Economic Power: China’s Economic Rise and the East Asian 
Security Order,” European Journal of International Relations 25, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 303, 318–9, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118757854. 
3 
from a “self-selection” of migrants to move to higher-income and wealthier regions.3   
According to this theory, a “natural equilibrium” in migration movement occurs when 
people are either “pushed” to leave their country due to low wages, low employment 
opportunities, or high inequality, or are “pulled” into a more attractive country that 
provides better economic and/or political prospects.4   
O’Reilly noted shortcomings of a push-pull theory, as it ignores non-economic 
reasons for migration, including the role of states in policy formation, and erroneously 
assumes automatic migration from low-income to high-income areas (not true in many 
cases, including Japan’s).5  Related micro-level theories of the neoclassical theory sees an 
individual (as in the “rational actor model) or a group/family/community (as in the new 
economics of labor migration theory) as “rational actor[s] making the cost benefit analysis” 
to either stay in place or migrate, based on “maximizing their return,” whether these 
benefits are monetary, quality of life, etc.6 
The Dual/Segmented labor market theory builds on the push-pull theory, but also 
argues that developed nations require an influx of immigrants from less-developed 
countries to fill mostly unskilled, temporarily, lower-wage work.7  Fussell concludes that 
this influx results in a “segmented labor market,” where the lower-skilled, lower-wage jobs 
are sectioned off to migrant workers and avoided by its citizens, as they seek employment 
higher up in the economic value-chain.8  The World Systems theory also relies on the 
 
3 Karen O’Reilly, “1. Migration Theories: A Critical Overview,” In Routledge Handbook of 
Immigration and Refugee Studies, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 2–6; 
Elizabeth Fussell, “Space, Time, and Volition: Dimensions of Migration Theory,” In Oxford Handbook of 
the Politics of International Migration, ed. Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor, (Oxford University 




5 O’Reilly, “1. Migration Theories: A Critical Overview,” 2–6. 
6 Fussell, “Space Time and Volition: Dimensions of Migration Theory,” 4. 
7 O’Reilly, “Migration Theories: A Critical Overview,” 3–4; Fussell, “Space Time and Volition: 
Dimensions of Migration Theory,” 4. 
8 Fussell, “Space Time and Volition: Dimensions of Migration Theory,” 4–5. 
4 
“push-pull” basis for immigration but emphasizes the exploitative role of 
developed capitalist countries in utilizing cheaper labor from poorer nations.9 
The New Economic theory, meanwhile, emphasize non-financial factors that 
influence immigration; this theory highlights the impact of existing, informal migration 
networks that provide a support system for incoming immigrants, facilitating better 
integration to their adopted country.10  Fussell concludes that the social capital theory 
similarly emphasizes non-financial elements that influences immigration, illustrating that 
“when a group migrates and acquires migration-specific information and relationships, 
social capital spreads to the group’s other members and facilitates their migration.”11 
Mexico to U.S. immigration provides an example of this dynamic.12 
In sum, the above-outlined migration theories discuss the macro-level and micro-
level rationales for the migratory movement of peoples from one country to another. The 
majority emphasized economic arguments in affecting migratory patterns. 
2. Labor Migration Policy Theories
The second section discusses different labor migration policy frameworks that 
influence a state’s migration policies, and in turn, its migration patterns. Balch categorizes 
these approaches into six sections: (1) political economy approaches; (2) institutional; (3) 
“right based accounts and embedded liberalism”; (4) “varieties of nationhood”; (5) 
International relations perspectives; and (6) cognitive approaches.13 
The political economy models stress Freeman’s theory of the influence of 
businesses in liberalizing migration policies, due to their “need for lower cost labor,” as an 
9 O’Reilly, “Migration Theories: A Critical Overview,” 4–5; Fussell, “Space Time and Volition: 
Dimensions of Migration Theory,” 4–5. 
10 O’Reilly, “Migration Theories: A Critical Overview,” 3–4. 
11 Fussell, “Space Time and Volition: Dimensions of Migration Theory,” 11. 
12 Fussell, “Space Time and Volition: Dimensions of Migration Theory,” 11. 
13 Alex Balch, Managing Labour Migration in Europe: Ideas, Knowledge and Policy Change. 
(Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2010) 19–29. 
5 
effective counter to anti-immigration groups.14  Balch states that in this model, “politicians 
maximize utility by responding to domestic interests,” that is, by determining migration 
policy based on economic need; related models include the corporatist approach and the 
Money’s model that show the opposite power of anti-immigration elements in formulating 
restrictive immigration policies.15   Critiques to this approach include its overly simplistic 
reasoning for the immigration policy-making process, and its “liberal democratic” bias that 
assumes a “US-style pluralism” as the natural outcome of developed countries.16 
The institutionalist approach highlights the role of institutions in policy-making. 
Rational institutionalists identify the results when conflict exists between policy 
recommendations received through knowledge (i.e., via research or studies) and when 
institutional frameworks impede the extent of policies that can be pursued; for example, 
the rational institutional approach explains politicians’ tendency to pursue policies 
contrary to recommended actions.17  Historical and sociological institutionalists, 
meanwhile, highlight the importance of historical and social ideas and norms in 
determining policy.18  For example, Balch showed how immigration of people from 
former colonies of Europe continue to affect their ability to enact policies controlling or 
restricting such movement, and how “international [social] norms” of refugee 
integration have the same effect on policy-making.19 
Hollifield espoused the “rights-based accounts” and embedded liberalism approach 
which argued that “inherent liberal qualities of institutions constrain the capacity of 
governments to implement and enforce restrictive measures against immigration.”20  This 
approach would explain the United States’ conflict against implementing restrictive 
immigration policies as “anti-Democratic” and anti-American, but it would not explain 
14 Ibid., 20. 
15 Ibid., 20–22. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 22. 
18 Ibid., 23. 
19 Alex Balch, Managing Labour Migration in Europe: Ideas, Knowledge and Policy Change, 23. 
20 Ibid., 23–24. 
6 
similar restrictive policies of other countries like Japan. A related theory concerns the 
“varieties of nationhood” approach, which postulates that it is the nation’s historical “ideas 
of nationhood” which define its priorities and identity, which in turn, define its attitudes 
towards immigrants and immigration policies.21 
The International relations approach to migration policy focus on either 
immigration in the umbrella of foreign policy (realist approach) or the economic liberalism 
as it extends to migration patterns (liberalist approach).22  Balch describes a related theory, 
the globalisation approach, which states that increasing globalization have weakened the 
state, blurred traditional geographic boundaries, and made migration more prevalent and 
inevitable.23  Finally, the cognitive approach focuses not on rational reasoning for policy 
formulation, but emotional triggers: with regards to immigration, this can either be a “group 
inclusion” (pro-immigration) or a “group threat” (anti-immigration) emotion.24  The 
degree that it gravitates between inclusion and threat would depend on the nation’s 
ideational norms. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
The purpose of this research is to understand the elements that shape Japan’s
immigration policy. To answer this question, this thesis analyzes the three dominating 
factors in immigration policy decisions: (1) economic factors; (2) political/institutional; 
and (3) cultural. These factors may not be exclusive and in many cases, may provide 
simultaneous, compatible explanations. 
(1) Hypothesis 1: Economic Factors determine policy
This hypothesis examines the extent that economic incentives have affected 
immigration policy. It postulates that the financial pain from a country’s economic 
stagnation, aggravated by the rapidly declining population (resulting in decreased available 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 24–26. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 26–27. 
7 
workforce), is not sufficient to compel broad immigration reforms and the construction of 
an overarching policy. Additionally, it proposes that current immigration work-arounds 
have satisfactorily provided a stop-gap to the need for an increased labor force; these work-
arounds include increased automation, increased efficiency and output, and the 
employment of rural, women, and the “younger” elderly. 
(2) Hypothesis 2: Political and institutional factors influence policy   
This hypothesis examines the extent of Chiavacchi’s argument that institutional 
constructs have prevented the formation of a comprehensive immigration policy, and have 
instead encouraged a piece-meal, reactionary policy process.25  It will analyze the extent 
that the institutions cause “fragmented policies” due to their lack of integration efforts. It 
will also examine how different political actors frame the immigration as either a “security” 
or “integration” issue.26 
(3) Hypothesis 3: Japan’s strategic culture directs the immigration narrative   
This hypothesis postulates that Japan’s strategic culture (its history, shared beliefs, 
national identity) shapes how immigration is viewed and how immigration policy-making 
is discussed. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis assesses the empirical evidence of each of the different hypothesis. For 
each of the potential explanations, this thesis examines case studies of specific policies and 
how each hypothesis provides the basis for the policy’s inception or change. It also draws 
evidence from previous scholarly analysis on the various potential explanations. For 
example, the cultural factors chapter will observe previous historical analysis on Japan’s 
 
25 David Chiavacci, “Indispensable Future Workers or Internal Security Threat?”  In Governing 
Insecurity in Japan: The Domestic Discourse and Policy Response, ed. Wilhelm Vosse, Reinhard Drifte, 
and Verena Blechinger-Talcott Abingdon (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 131–132. 
26 Gabriele Vogt, “Friend and Foe: Juxtaposing Japan’s Migration Discourses,”  In Governing 
Insecurity in Japan: The Domestic Discourse and Policy Response, ed. Wilhelm Vosse, Reinhard Drifte, 
and Verena Blechinger-Talcott (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 62–64. 
8 
national identity and how it shapes perceptions on immigration (utilizing national 
survey/polls), including how it affects the policy discourse within Japan’s government. 
This thesis utilizes primary sources where readily available to include government 
reports by the Ministry of Justice (including summaries and statistics) and institutional 
white papers from sources such as the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (CAO) and 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). However, the majority of the evidence 
is derived from secondary sources, focusing on academic books and edited works regarding 
immigration, as well as scholarly journals, internet blogs, news articles, and non-profit 
think tanks. In analyzing the cultural factors influencing Japan’s immigration policy, it 
would also be sensible to examine the various public opinion polls, surveys, and other 
qualitative data on immigration, and how those statistics varied with time through different 
immigration policy adjustments. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the major research 
question and its significance, provides a literature review on the subject and gives a short 
explanation on possible hypothesis. Following the introduction, Chapter II provides 
context on Japan’s immigration patterns and enumerates that various reasons that the 
country’s immigration system is considered restrictive. Chapter III presents an overview 
of Japan’s immigration history, focusing on policy adjustments from 1980s-1990s to the 
present day. Chapters IV to VI examines Japan’s immigration policy rational: what shapes 
the country’s immigration policies?  This complex question cannot be answered without 
looking at three relevant areas that significantly affect policy-making: (1) economic; (2) 
political/institutional; and (3) cultural.     
Chapter IV analyzes the economic incentives behind major Japanese immigration 
policy proposals. Japanese Immigration policy-making seems driven, in large part, to 
economic incentives. CAO and METI’s more open immigration stance is based on Japan’s 
economic need for foreign migrants to maintain its economic efficiency and counter its 
9 
population decline.27  Japan went through its initial immigration reforms in 1990s as a 
response to increased demand for unskilled labor due to the economic boom.28  And even 
its recent policy changes, including the new Nikkeijin policy and the Canada-style point 
system for high-skilled immigrants, was designed to enable Japan to remain competitive 
and maintain its technological edge.29 
Chapter V examines the political and institutional factors affect the way Japan’s 
immigration policy is approached. It considers how political and institutional actors frame 
their policy recommendations, from linking immigration policy to national security 
concerns to carefully selecting policy terminologies that won’t invoke negative public 
sentiment. It surveys institutional factors may limit comprehensive immigration policy 
shifts, and the resulting disparity between immigration policy and the resulting 
immigration trends. Chapter V also addresses the effects of local governments and civil 
advocacy groups in advancing immigration policy. 
Chapter VI examines the cultural basis in pursuing restrictive immigration policies. 
Chapter VI surveys whether, as Tsuda argues, Japan’s cultural identity as a homogeneous 
nation drives its restrictive immigration policies30, and to what extent, if any, cultural 
mistrust of the “other” results in strong discourse regarding the correlation between 
increasing immigration and increased crime and insecurity.31  Chapter VI considers the 
desire to remain culturally homogeneous and its conflict with the competing narrative of 
Japan as one that pursues tabunkakyousei or “the coexistence with multiple cultures.” 
Finally, chapter VII discusses conclusions drawn by this research, and examines 
the extent to which each of the three major areas—political/institutional, economic, and 
 
27 David Chiavacci, “Indispensable Future Workers or Internal Security Threat?”  In Governing 
Insecurity in Japan: The Domestic Discourse and Policy Response, ed. Wilhelm Vosse, Reinhard Drifte, 
and Verena Blechinger-Talcott (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 119–121. 
28 Erin Aeran Chung, Immigration and Citizenship in Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 150. 
29 Keiko Hirata, Japan: The Paradox of Harmony (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 119–
122. 
30 Tsuda, “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights:  The Significance of Local Citizenship in 
Recent Countries of Immigration,” 20. 
31 Chiavacci, “Indispensable Future Workers or Internal Security Threat?” 124–127. 
10 
cultural) shaped Japan’s immigration policy. Chapter VII answers the initial research 
questions and suggests future policy recommendations. 
11 
II. JAPAN’S IMMIGRATION PATTERNS  
The next chapter demonstrates that Japan’s immigration patterns and policy choices 
throughout the years seem to corroborate the conventional scholarly wisdom that Japan’s 
immigration system has been and remains restrictive. To do this, it first provides a short 
overview of Japan’s immigration numbers, concentrating from the 1990s to the present day 
as that period provides the most dynamic immigration policy changes that the Japanese 
government adapted in response to increasing economic and social need. First, Section A 
compares Japan’s immigration numbers to other OECD countries as a percentage of the 
population and concludes that the country’s immigration rates lag behind its counterparts. 
Section B provides an overview of the immigrant composition. Section C demonstrates 
that Japan’s low immigration numbers extend to its refugee acceptance rates. Section D 
gives evidence of Japan’s preference for temporary immigration providing only a limited 
path to gain long-term residency as opposed to allowing avenues for permanent migration. 
Finally, Section E argues that the lack of immigration integration support structure 
contributes to the low immigration trends and Section F concludes that the various data 
above provides sufficient proof that Japan’s immigration can be accurately described as 
low and restrictive.  
A. IMMIGRATION NUMBERS 
The overall trend of foreigners immigrating to Japan is comparatively low when 
compared to other developed countries. Japan’s foreigner population remained steady 
around 600,000 to 880,000 from the 1970s to 1990, or approximately 0.6-0.7% of the total 
population.32 Starting in 1990, the foreigner population increased commensurate with 
Japan’s immigration policy implementations in the 1990s and 2000s. In 2000, the 
population grew to 1.3 million (or 1% of the total population); in 2010, foreigners 
comprised 1.3% of inhabitants; by 2014, the 2.4 million foreign immigrants comprised 
 
32 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Summary of the Results of Population Census of Japan 2010 
(Tokyo:Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2010), 416, 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/2010/final_en/pdf/summary.pdf 
12 
1.9% of the total population.33 Japan’s immigration numbers showed a slight increase in 
the last five years, as Shinzo Abe’s cabinet pursued immigration policies designed to accept 
a larger foreign workforce, most recently in the 2018 Immigration Policy for skilled and 
semi-skilled workers. Foreign residents in 2020 reached 2.8 million. While this is one of 
Japan’s highest recorded foreign resident population figures, it still only represents about 
2.2% of the total population, significantly lagging compared to other OECD countries.34 
Figure 1 shows immigration trends from 1985 to 2020, while Figure 2 exhibits the 
migration rates in the last ten years for OECD countries. 




33 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Summary of the Results of Population Census of Japan 2010, 416; 
Takashi Kodama, “Japan’s Immigration Problem: Looking at Immigration Through the Experience of 
Other Countries,” Daiwa Institute of Research (29 May 2015): 3, 
https://www.dir.co.jp/english/research/report/others/20150529_009776.pdf 
34 OECD (2020), International Migration Outlook 2020, (Paris: Routledge, 2020), 26,  
Http://doi.org/10.1787/ec98f531-en. 
35 Source: Immigration Services Agency of Japan, Initiatives to Accept New Foreign Nationals and 
for the Realization of Society of Harmonious Existence, 930004452 (Tokyo Japan: Ministry of Justice, 
2021), 1, https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/content/930004452.pdf. 
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Figure 2. Permanent Migration Flows to Selected OECD Countries, 
2010–19 Percentage of the Total Population36 
 
 
B. IMMIGRANT COMPOSITION 
The foreign residents consist of Koreans (including Zainichis, or ethnic Koreans 
with residence roots in Japanese-colonzedl Korea) at 24.4%, Chinese at 31.1% (many of 
whom receive their immigrant status from the foreign Technical Intern Trainee Program, 
or TITP, and foreign students/working visa program), South Americans at 11.5% 
(consisting mainly of Nikkejin, or South Americans who are ethnically Japanese), Filipinos 
at 10.3% (utilizing either the nursing visa or the “entertainment” visa), and other Asian 
countries at 16%. 37Foreign visas can be obtained from several sources, including: (1) the 
Nikkejin program, which allowed ethnic Japanese and their families from South American 
countries such as Brazil and Peru to immigrate regardless of their work-skill level; (2) the 
Technical Intern Training Program, which gave low-skill foreigners training, employment, 
and temporary resident status (up to three years); (3) foreign student programs, which 
allowed foreign students to stay after their education for work-related purposes; and (4) 
 
36 Source: OECD (2020), International Migration Outlook 2020, 26. 
37 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Summary of the Results of Population Census of Japan 2010, 416; 
Takashi Kodama, “Japan’s Immigration Problem: Looking at Immigration Through the Experience of 
Other Countries,” 14–15. 
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refugee status.38 Of these, only the Nikkeijin and the refugee programs offer a path for 
long-term residency, and the bar to meet the GOJ’s definition of refugee often precludes 
the majority of prospective refugees from receiving approval. 
C. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 
Japan’s low immigration numbers extend to the country’s refugee admissions 
program. Japan’s asylum numbers fall behind that of other comparable OECD countries, 
both in terms of the number of applications compared to the country’s total population and 
the country’s asylum applications approval rate. In 2014, for example, Omata states that 
Germany received over 173,000 asylum requests, approving 20% of the applicants; the UK 
and the United States reported similar approval numbers, with the United States accepting 
29% of 85,000 asylum requests, and the UK accepting 37% of the approximately 32,000 
cases.39 In the same year, Omata cites that Japan received 5,000 asylum seekers and 
accepted only 11 refugees, or a miniscule 0.2% acceptance rate.  
We see the same low acceptance rate five years later. Figure 3 provides the number 
of accepted asylum requests by selected countries. In 2019, Japan received 10,375 asylum 
applicants but only recognized 44 of them: an acceptance rate of 0.4%, especially low when 
compared to the asylum recognition rates of 25.9% for Germany, 29.6% for the United 
States, and 55.7% for Canada.40 Hashimoto reasons that overall low number of refugee 
applicants can be explained, in part, by Japan’s distance from unstable countries and its 
strict application of refugee status using the UN definition of “individuals who possess a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
or membership in a particular group,” excluding those facing private or economic 
 
38 Erin Aeran Chung, Immigration and Citizenship in Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 152–154. 
39 Naohiko Omata, “Open Wallet, Closed Doors: Exploring Japan’s Low Acceptance of Asylum 
Seekers,” Migration Policy Institute, October 7, 2015, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/open-wallet-
closed-doors-exploring-japan%E2%80%99s-low-acceptance-asylum-seekers. 
40 Nippon, “Japan Accepts 47 Refugees in 2020 as Applicants Fall by 60% Due to Pandemic,” April 
30, 2021, Nippon.com, https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00991/. 
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difficulties.41 While geographic factors may justify the low numbers of total applicants, 
they do not explain Japan’s low acceptance rate. The low refugee acceptance percentages 
have not escaped international scrutiny; in 2014, after Japan declined all 61 Syrian asylum 
applicants from settling in the country, the UN High Commission for Refugees criticized 
Japan’s methods as “rigid and restrictive.”42 As Japan continues to define the term 
“refugee” based on its most rigid application, it is unlikely that refugee acceptance patterns 
will change in the near future. 





41 Naoko Hashimoto, “Why Does Japan Recognise so Few Refugees?” Refugee Law Initiative Blog 
(blog), May 1, 2018, https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/05/01/why-does-japan-recognise-so-few-refugees/; 
Daisuke Kikuchi and Chisato Tanaka, “Japan Toughens Screening Rules for Refugees; Automatic Work 
Permits Ditched,” The Japan Times Online, January 12, 2018, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/12/national/japan-tighten-refugee-screening-system-starting-
next-week/. 
42 “No Entry; Japan’s Asylum Laws.” The Economist, March 14, 2015, 
http://www.proquest.com/docview/1663942334/abstract/2C4644E5779D4ABDPQ/1. 
43 Source: Nippon, “Japan Accepts 47 Refugees In 2020 as Applicants Fall by 60% due to Pandemic,” 
April 30, 2021, Nippon.com, https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00991/. 
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D. PERMANENT VS. TEMPORARY IMMIGRATION
Additional evidence of Japan’s low and restrictive immigration pattern is in its 
emphasis on temporary workers, personnel who are expected to return to their countries of 
origin after completing their contracts, vice long-term immigrants, who arrive in the 
country with some expectation of or path to receiving permanent residency or even 
citizenship. According to Tsuda, Japan has “one of the most restrictive immigration 
policies among advanced industrialized countries” with three basic tenets: (1) “no unskilled 
foreign workers”; (2) policies would encourage only “highly skilled and professional 
workers”; and (3) “all foreigners are accepted at a temporary basis only.”44 The majority 
of their foreign worker programs in the 1990s to early 2000s, including the foreign student 
program, the Technical Intern Training Program, and worker programs through bilateral 
Economic Partnership Agreements, provide only limited, temporary visas with little to no 
option for long-term residency. For example, TITP grants visas lasting up three years; other 
trainee programs grant only one-year visas, and the student visa program only grants stays 
for six months after graduation.45 Even the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
programs that facilitate the migration of much-needed nurses and caregivers from 
Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and the Philippines are limited; only 300 yearly 
slots are open, and the visas are restricted to three years for nurses and four years for 
caregivers unless the health workers pass a series of stringent certifications and tests.46 
E. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT AND RIGHTS
Japan’s low immigration patterns can be demonstrated not only by presenting the
country’s immigration numbers in comparison with other similar democratic countries but 
through drawing evidence inferred from Japanese integration efforts. Robert asserts that 
effective “social integration” policies will go a long way in ensuring the integration of 
44 Takeyuki Tsuda, “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local 
Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration,” in Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: 
Japan in Comparative Perspective, ed. Takeyuki Tsuda (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 12–13. 
45 Chung, Immigration and Citizenship in Japan, 152–154. 
46 Hirata, Japan: The Paradox of Harmony, 116–7. 
17 
immigrants in the country, whether they are temporary or long-term residents.47 Robert 
further outlined the major elements of social integration as previously described by 
Bosswick and Heckman:48 
• (1) structural integration (the acquisition of rights and the access to
position and status in the core institutions of the host society);
• (2) cultural integration (or acculturation);
• (3) interactive integration (the acceptance and inclusion of immigrants
in the primary relationships and social network of the host society); and
• (4) identificational integration (inclusion in a new society on the
subjective level as indicated by feelings of belonging to and
identification with the host society).49
In Japan’s case, even after foreigners utilize various immigration opportunities to 
move to Japan—whether on a temporary or permanent basis—the lack of accessible, 
comprehensive immigration support increases the challenges they face in the country, 
thereby contributing to the likelihood that they are unable to stay on a long-term basis. For 
instance, Southeast Asian nurses and caregivers under the EPA worker program in the 
2010s received little institutional support that would have enabled them to improve their 
chances of gaining the certification and passing other testing needed to qualify for long-
term residence. In fact, the Japanese Nursing Association protested against proposals of 
test process reforms that would have increased the percentage of immigrant nurses that 
passed the certification programs.50 Another prominent example is the Nikkeijin program 
immigrants. Despite being one of few immigration programs that afford long-term 
residency, Strausz inferred that partly due to the dominant view of Nikkeijin as temporary 
workers rather than residents or future citizens, they were not afforded sufficient 
47 Stephen Robert, “Multicultural Coexistence Policies of Local Governments in the Tokyo 
Metropolis: A Comparative Examination of Social Integration in Response to Growing Ethnic Diversity,” 
in Migration and Diversity in Asian Contexts, ed. Saw Ai Brenda Yeoh, Francis Leo Collins, and Ah Eng 
La (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), 60–2, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/23417. 
48 Stephen Robert, “Multicultural Coexistence Policies of Local Governments in the Tokyo 
Metropolis: A Comparative Examination of Social Integration in Response to Growing Ethnic Diversity,” 
60–2. 
49 Stephen Robert, “Multicultural Coexistence Policies of Local Governments in the Tokyo 
Metropolis: A Comparative Examination of Social Integration in Response to Growing Ethnic Diversity,” 
60–2. 
50 Hirata, Japan: The Paradox of Harmony, 117–8. 
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community support or citizenship rights, remaining largely segregated from their local 
communities.51 Nikkeijin integration was inadequate, likely contributing to the GOJ’s 2009 
initiative to financially compensate Nikkeijin to return to their countries of origin, and 
significantly decreasing the Nikkeijin population in the later years.52 
F. CONCLUSION 
In sum, Japan’s overall immigration numbers and different immigration trends 
validate the consensus among scholars that Japan’s immigration is low and restrictive. 
Japan’s immigration numbers are relatively low compared to other developed countries. 
The country’s immigration composition demonstrates that a significant percentage of the 
immigrants are in the country on a limited, temporary basis vice becoming long-term 
residents afforded full or partial citizenship rights. Lack of social integration support 
further exacerbated Japan’s low immigration trends. 
 
51 Michael Strausz, Help (Not) Wanted: Immigration Politics in Japan (New York: SUNY Press, 
2019), loc. 178–200 of 3852, Kindle edition. 
52 Michael Strausz, Help (Not) Wanted: Immigration Politics in Japan (New York: SUNY Press, 
2019), loc. 178–200 of 3852, Kindle edition. 
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III. IMMIGRATION HISTORY
Unlike other developed countries founded on immigrant roots such as the United 
States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, Japan is considered a recent country of 
immigration. Furthermore, its history as a secluded nation during the Tokugawa era and its 
relatively homogeneous demography contributed to its somewhat restrictive position 
towards migrants. This chapter provides a short overview of Japan’s immigration history 
to better contextualize the various internal and external factors that contribute to its 
restrictive immigration system.
Japan’s economic growth in the 1980s-1990s resulted in an increased demand for 
migrant (often low-skill) labor that conflicted with Japan’s “no unskilled foreign workers” 
principle; as a result, the Japanese government established immigration reforms (via the 
1990 Immigration Control and Refugee recognition Act) that provided “legal loopholes” 
to allow immigration of unskilled labor.53  First, it allowed the “Nikkeijin visa,” where 
ethic Japanese and their families from South American countries are allowed entry, 
regardless of their job-skill level.54  The policy reasoned that allowing ethnic Japanese 
would ensure an easier and more successful assimilation of immigrants; in practice little 
assimilation occurred, while the Nikkeijin provided a much needed influx of unskilled 
workers.55  Second, the Technical Intern Training Program, established in 1993, in theory 
enabled foreign workers to gain technical expertise via “on-the-job training;” in practice 
businesses could not meet the demands for training and instructions, and TITP workers 
remained untrained and became another source of unskilled labor.56   Third, immigration 
53 Erin Aeran Chung, Immigration and Citizenship in Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 150–151; Tsuda, “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local 
Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration,” 14–16. 
54 Chung, Immigration and Citizenship in Japan, 152–153; Tsuda, “Localities and the Struggle for 
Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration,” 14–16. 
55 Tsuda, “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local Citizenship in 
Recent Countries of Immigration,” 14–16. 
56 Tsuda, “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local Citizenship in 
Recent Countries of Immigration,” 14–16. 
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policy regarding student visas was revised in 1990, 2004 and 2007 to allow students to 
extend their stays after graduation and gaining employment; in practice, immigrants often 
utilized these student visas to get unskilled jobs, and not to gain education.57  Finally, the 
“entertainment visa” served to bring unskilled labor from mostly Southeast Asian countries 
(like the Philippines), with migrants working in bars and nightclubs, and some exploited 
for prostitution.58 
Japan’s immigration history reflects the conflict that the Japanese government faces 
in meeting immigration demands (including those for unskilled labor) while continuing to 
keep its nation’s national identity (or ethnic homogeneity). Its restrictive immigration 
policy extends to its refugee policy, where the country is considered one of the most 
restrictive in granting refugee asylums; in 2017, it approved 0.2% of refugee applicants, or 
20 people.59   
More recently, economic and social dynamics have made immigration reform a 
more urgent matter. Japan continues its Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) programs 
with Vietnam and Philippines in order to receive technically trained nurses and other 
medical workers, as it seeks to find nurses to care for its rapidly aging population.60  A 
new Nikkejin policy in 2008 enabled children of Japanese citizens to gain legal status if 
their paternity has been determined; this policy applied to thousands out-of-wedlock 
children of Japanese fathers and their Filipino mothers (mostly on entertainment visas).61  
The government also adopted new policies to attract skilled foreign workers, using a point 
system similar to Canada’s in determining a migrant’s desirability.62  While the Japanese 
government seems to be responding to the economic and social need to reform its 
 
57 Erin Aeran Chung, Immigration and Citizenship in Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 153–154. 
58 Tsuda, “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local Citizenship in 
Recent Countries of Immigration,” 15–16. 
59 Naoko Hashimoto, “Why Does Japan Recognise so Few Refugees?” Refugee Law Initiative Blog 
(blog), May 1, 2018, https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/05/01/why-does-japan-recognise-so-few-refugees/. 
60 Keiko Hirata, Japan: The Paradox of Harmony (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 116–
119. 
61 Hirata, Japan: The Paradox of Harmony, 119–120. 
62 Hirata, Japan: The Paradox of Harmony, 121–123. 
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immigration program, there seems to be no overarching policy that guides its policy 
changes; rather, the piece-meal, “reactionary” policies reflect the internal struggle policy-




63 Tsuda, “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local Citizenship in 
Recent Countries of Immigration,” 20. 
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IV. ECONOMIC FACTORS
The following sections briefly analyze economic factors that influence Japan’s 
immigration policy, focusing on the actors that advocate for economically-driven 
immigration policy reforms. First, section A shows data on economic worker shortages and 
discusses a few different economic actors advocating for change. Section B addresses the 
issues that prevent the same economic actors from making significant policy influence, and 
finally section C will summarize the findings.
A. ECONOMIC ACTORS
Japan has been experiencing long-term labor shortage. Figure 4 shows that Japan
leads other OECD countries with regards to labor shortages, with 86% of Japanese 
businesses experiencing hiring challenges (next highest country is below 70%).64  
Aggravating this labor shortage, Japan also has one of the lowest number of immigrants; 
Figure 5 shows a select number of OECD countries and the percentage of labor shortage 
they experience compared to their percentage of immigrants.65 
64 Michael Strausz, Help (Not) Wanted: Immigration Politics in Japan (New York: SUNY Press, 
2019), loc. 222 of 3852, Kindle edition. 
65 Michael Strausz, Help (Not) Wanted: Immigration Politics in Japan, loc. 333 of 3852, Kindle 
edition. 
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66 Source: Michael Strausz, Help (Not) Wanted: Immigration Politics in Japan (New York: SUNY 
Press, 2019), loc. 222 of 3852, Kindle edition. 
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These statistics would support the importance of considering economic factors in 
immigration policymaking. This section will concentrate on economic actors. Perhaps the 
most visible actor that lobbies for various business interests is the Japan Business 
Federation, or Nippon Keidanren, an organization established in 1946 and composed of 
more than 1,400 Japanese companies whose goal is to advocate for policies that furthers 
the development of the country’s economy.68 Keidanren advocates for a more open 
immigration, increasing the total number of worker immigrants and providing them the 
support structure to thrive in the country. For example, Keidanren’s 2025 outlook sees a 
more streamlined immigration system that adapts to the needs of the country, while fully 
 
67 Source: Michael Strausz, Help (Not) Wanted: Immigration Politics in Japan, loc. 333 of 3852, 
Kindle edition. 
68 “About Keidanren,” Japan Business Organization, Keidanren, accessed September 20, 2021, 
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/pro001.html. 
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integrating the current immigrants for a more “vibrant [country] diversity.”69  
Additionally, while he demurred on the issue of needing a comprehensive immigration 
policy, Keidanren’s chairman in 2018 did state that Japan needs to move away from its 
“homogeneous...social structure” and embrace internationalization through increased 
immigration.70  Other economic actors, such as the Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (JCCI), embrace the same open-immigration proposals; Haig notes that JCCI 
previously advocated for Technical Trainee program to expand its duration and to provide 
avenues for long-term employment and residency once the worker completes the training 
cycle.71 
Surveys also show that even the Japanese public, ordinarily known to be immigrant-
adverse, make exceptions for foreign worker movements that they deem beneficial. After 
conducting extensive interviews with over 20 Japanese citizens from a diverse 
demographic, Davidson and Peng conclude that while the Japanese public are overall 
averse to immigration, they exhibit what Davidson and Peng refer to as “pragmatic 
divergence” where respondents display positive association for immigration that they see 
personal benefits in, which sometimes overcomes any cultural-based reservations that they 
might harbor.72 Davidson and Peng go on to say that respondents favor short-term 
immigration paths driven by economic need and demonstrate especially strong favorable 
attitudes towards immigrant care workers (such as nurses and caregivers entering under the 
 
69 “Japan 2025: Envisioning a Vibrant, Attractive Nation in the 21st Century,” Japan Business 
Organization, Keidanren, Accessed September 22, 2021, 
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/vision2025.pdf. 
70 “Chairman Nakanishi’s Statements and Comments at His Press Conference,” Japan Business 
Organization, Keidanren, September 25, 2018, 
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71 Ken Haig, “Japanese Immigration Policy,” in The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics, ed. 
Alisa Gaunder (London: Routledge, 2011), 223–235, 
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72 Jeremy Davison and Ito Peng, “Views on Immigration in Japan: Identities, Interests, and Pragmatic 
Divergence,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 47, no. 11 (August 18, 2021): 2584–9, 
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Economic Partnership Agreements), reasoning that such workers qualify as “skilled” and 
are economically desired.73 
B. ISSUES
Most economic actors, to include the Keidanren business organization, seem to
advocate for policies that would ostensibly open up Japan, welcome more foreign workers, 
and allow a more open immigration strategy. However, this is not truly reflected in overall 
immigration policy reforms. Why do economic actors fail to influence significant 
immigration policies? Scholars suggest that economic actors do not have significant 
influence in the immigration policy-making process. Chiavacci concludes that GOJ 
ministries remain insulated to economic pressures to open up immigration.74 This 
insulation is perhaps due to what Chiavacci identifies as institutional limitations preventing 
a more comprehensive policy, for example the lack of a unifying ministry in charge of 
overall immigration policy and implementation.75 This limitation makes advocating for 
immigration reform much more challenging, as business groups cannot concentrate their 
lobbying efforts to a single entity or a single policy. This lack of influence extends not only 
to Japan’s ministries, but the political parties in charge of the government; LDP’s long 
government control due to their party strength and size also makes them less likely to be 
vulnerable to outside pressures, to include economic pressures from business interests. 
Chiavacci also determines that “a labor market perspective was never dominant, and the 
institutional fragmentation increased the immunity of important state actors against outside 
pressures, even from such a formidable lobby machine like Nippon Keidanren.”76 
73 Davison and Peng, “Views on Immigration in Japan: Identities, Interests, and Pragmatic 
Divergence,” 2586–90. 
74 David Chiavacci, “Japan as a New Immigration Country: The Gap between Immigration Policy and 
Actual Immigration in International Comparison,” in Hiraku Nihon – Tojiru Nihon: “Ningen Idōgaku” 
Kotohajime [Open Japan – Closed Japan: Towards Interdisciplinary Studies in Human Mobility], ed. 
Hayashi Yōko and Naoki Aoki (Osaka: Osaka University, 2017), 85–6. 
75 Chiavacci, “Japan as a New Immigration Country: The Gap between Immigration Policy and 
Actual Immigration in International Comparison,” 81–93. 
76 David Chiavacci, “New Immigration, Civic Activism and Identity in Japan: Influencing the 
‘Strong’ State,” in Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia: Between Entanglement and 
Contention in Post High Growth, ed. David Chiavacci, Simona Grano, and Julia Obinger (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 194. 
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Freeman and Chiavacci identify another issue with economically-motivated 
immigration policies, citing a cost-and-benefit disparity between the relevant actors.77 
Chiavacci continues to say that “while the costs [of immigration] are widely spread in 
society, profits are concentrated among a few economic actors, i.e. employers.”78 One can 
use the immigrants entering via the Technical Intern Training Program as an example. The 
businesses that sponsored their entries benefit by receiving a stable supply of low-cost 
labor, which in turn benefit their business. However, the costs of the Technical Trainees’ 
stay are not incurred by the businesses but by different government agencies and the 
general public; costs are incurred by the different ministries that must manage their visas 
and provide benefits like health care and education, by the local governments that must 
provide a support structure to better integrate the Technical Trainees, and by the general 
public who will have to interact and perhaps compete with the immigrants. This cost-and-
benefit disparity can lead business groups to advocate for immigration proposals that fail 
to consider the long-term effects of the increased immigration. Alternatively, local 
governments, government agencies, and the general public may be more wary to support 
such proposals. 
Finally, even when economic actors successfully lobby in favor of additional 
immigration avenues, the resulting reforms often do not go far enough or other actors limit 
its implementation. For instance, the Nurse visa program made possible by the Economic 
Partnership Agreements only admitted a limited number of nurses and their length of stay 
were limited by strict and inflexible institutional testing and certification requirements.79  
Another example is the Technical Trainees, who were not afforded longer visa durations 
and more flexible conditions despite Keidanran’s advocacy of the stated reforms. 
 
77 Gary P. Freeman, “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,” The International 
Migration Review 29, no. 4 (1995): 881–902, https://doi.org/10.2307/254772; Chiavacci, “Japan as a New 
Immigration Country: The Gap between Immigration Policy and Actual Immigration in International 
Comparison,” 85. 
78 Chiavacci, “Japan as a New Immigration Country: The Gap between Immigration Policy and 
Actual Immigration in International Comparison,” 85. 
79 Hirata, Japan: The Paradox of Harmony, 116–7. 
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C. CONCLUSION
This chapter provides a short examination of economic factors that affect
immigration policies. In sum, pro-business and other economic actors tend to favor a more 
open, less restrictive immigration system. However, certain issues prevent these economic 
actors from making a significant impact; these include challenges with the country’s 
political and institutional limitations, the disparity in the cost vs benefit for different actors, 
and the limited scope of reforms when they are passed.
30 
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V. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS  
According to Natter, immigration policies based on the “institutionalist literature 
with its emphasis on inter-institutional turf wars and bureaucratic politics provides a 
relevant theoretical framework to look at immigration policymaking across different 
political system.”80  The followings sections examine Japan’s immigration policy within 
this framework and argue  that various political and institutional factors collectively 
contribute to maintaining Japan’s restrictive immigration policy as the status quo. First, 
section A demonstrates the role of immigration language and branding in limiting 
discussions of deeper migrant issues. Next, section B describes the sources of political 
policy fragmentation and explores the effects that disjointed policies have on policy 
implementation. Finally, Section C briefly examines alternative institutional actors that 
have a more prominent role due to the lack of a comprehensive national immigration 
policy. 
A. IMMIGRATION LANGUAGE 
The terminologies that political and institutional actors utilize during immigration 
discourse is informative as it provides the context in which those actors frame the 
immigration issue. First, there is a general reluctance to label immigration issues as such. 
Several scholars noted that the Government of Japan’s formal references to the term 
“immigration” are few and far between. Endoh, for instance, asserts that the “GOJ avoids 
the use of the term imin (immigration or immigrants) in conjunction with its ‘foreign 
worker acceptance’ policies whereas the media imin as an ‘alien who settles [in a country 
outside their home state] for a long period.’”81  
Strausz concurs with Endoh’s claim, asserting that government representatives 
themselves avoid any mention of immigration due to long-held beliefs that Japan should 
 
80 Katharina Natter, “Rethinking Immigration Policy Theory Beyond ‘Western Liberal 
Democracies,’” Comparative Migration Studies 6, no. 1 (2018): 14, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-018-
0071-9. 
81 Toake Endoh, “The Politics of Japan’s Immigration and Alien Residence Control,” Asian and 
Pacific Migration Journal 28, no. 3 (September 2019): 326, https://doi.org/10.1177/0117196819873733. 
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not accept long-term foreigners; thus, most policy discourse regarding increasing 
immigration are framed instead as an economic need82, and immigrants are referred to as 
foreign workers. Strausz further asserts that the framing of migrants as foreign workers, 
vice settlers or immigrants, reflects the dominant perspective of immigrants as filling a 
temporary economic utility instead of permanent long-term residents or future citizens with 
membership rights. As an example, Roberts describes an LDP committee  in 2016 that 
recommended increased worker migration to “pave the way for the acceptance of all 
foreigners but ‘immigrants,’” describing immigrants as those not staying on a short-term 
visa with expiration dates.83  Liu-Farrer notes that after Shinzo Abe’s government passed 
extensive immigration reform in 2018, the Prime Minister spent significant time 
advertising the policy as a “temporary labor migration” and insisted that “it is not an 
immigration policy that will increase the permanent residents. Do not mix them, please.”84 
By eschewing the “immigrant” designation, government elites are able to avoid or limit 
discussions on significant migrant issues such as worker rights and residency paths. 
B. POLICY FRAGMENTATION 
1. Disjointed Immigration Strategy 
Japan’s Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) served as the majority political party for 
over 65 years, only briefly losing government control in 1993 and again from 2009 to 2012. 
As the political party in power, the LDP had several decades to develop a long-term 
immigration policies, but it seems it seems that they failed to enact a comprehensive 
immigration strategy during that period. Chiavacci asserts that several elements contribute 
to Japan’s disjointed immigration strategy:85 
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• (1) No pivotal state agency concerning immigration policy exists;
• (2) Ministries have different perspectives on immigration and the
central goals in immigration policy;
• (3) The politicians and political parties do not fill this gap of
bureaucratic leadership.86
Chiavacci further explains that the Ministry of Justice overseas the Immigration 
Control Bureau, an inter-agency immigration section weakened by disagreements and 
divisions due to the various ministries’ different policy goals; this results in a disjointed 
Japan strategy unable to pro-actively respond to unforeseen immigration issues.87  Milly 
endorses the disjointed strategy view, stating that various ministries often develop 
fragmented policies that primarily cover their own agencies’ concerns.88  Milly cites the 
following ministries as examples: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which influences the 
asylum and the trainee program; the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, which 
advocates for immigration reforms favorable to business interests; the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, which oversees student-intern visas 
and the Japan Exchange and Training (JET) English teach program; and the Ministry of 
Health, Labor, and Welfare, which determines health care and worker rights of foreigners. 
The varied immigration goals often resulted in policies shaped through each agency’s 
“stovepipes of excellence,” resulting in reforms determined in isolation from and without 
other agencies’ inputs.  
Milly further remarks that the Japanese courts also bear some culpability in Japan’s 
fragmented immigration policymaking, through court decisions that simultaneously 
pronounced that the MOJ both underutilized and over-utilized their jurisdiction on several 
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key immigration policy issues.89  Milly concludes that this decentralized immigration 
policy-making framework not only makes it challenging to develop a comprehensive 
immigration policy, but makes it challenging for foreign residents’ allies to advocate for 
progressive changes since it requires a multi-prong approach of lobbying multiple 
agencies.90 
2. LDP 
As Chiavacci maintains, political actors do not act to ameliorate Japan’s disjointed 
immigration policy, and at times intra-party differences can exacerbate the 
fragmentation.91  The Liberal Democratic Party’s long rule required the party to contain 
constituents within a big tent, holding a large number of distinct political factions that may 
sometimes have conflicting interests and goals. To maintain party unity, the LDP naturally 
defaults to the median, conservative, or moderate stance. Unfortunately, finding consensus 
within a large party for potentially contentious issues such as immigration policy reform 
can prove challenging, to say the least. As a result, most policy initiatives remain geared 
towards maintaining status quo. Douglass goes further and argues that LDP’s stranglehold 
on political power actually “resulted in more restrictive policies than [what] many sections 
of society actually support.”92 
Examples of LDP efforts to develop a comprehensive immigration policy are few 
and far in between. An LDP-endorsed immigration initiative in 2008, named the Sakanaka 
Plan after its architect, proposed an overhaul of the ministries’ immigration duties and 
advocated for a massive increase in immigration: up to 20 million new foreigners accepted 
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over 50 years to combat the country’s fast-shrinking population.93  However, Chiavacci 
notes that the party failed to get consensus due to increasing security and national identity 
concerns over such a significant change in the country’s demographics.94  Chiavacci 
further comments that such policy proposals remain dependent on individual politicians’ 
visions and their advocacy efforts; case in point, Chiavacci identifies a simple leadership 
change within the Ministry of Justice in 2007 as the root cause in the failure of earlier 
efforts to revamp the skilled-worker program to accept more applicants.95 
Tian and Chung support the status quo conclusion, with Chung arguing that 
“Political elites have prioritized social stability over liberal democratic principles in 
immigration policy” with reforms enacted “only after considerable [external] pressure from 
internal grassroots movements and international NGOs.”96  While more radical, 
progressive immigration policies find little support within the LDP, the same be said on 
the opposite spectrum: Chiavacci observes that Japan’s right-wing movements, while 
presenting a loud, anti-immigrant minority, have so far failed to significantly influence 
immigration reforms and their proposals continue to remain in the fringe of the political 
spectrum.97  Roberts states further that Abe and other LDP politicians demurred when 
asked about details on a future comprehensive immigration policy, inferring  instead that 
they should delay such policy discourse until they reach a “consensus of the people.”98  
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3. De Jure vice De Facto Immigration 
Japan’s disjointed immigration strategy occasionally resulted in what Chiavacci 
and Endoh refer to as policy “gaps”: that is, discrepancies between de jure immigration 
policies and de facto immigration in practice.99  We see evidence of this policy to reality 
gap when examining Japan’s different worker-visa programs, especially those enacted 
before the 2018 immigration reform. Chiavacci points out the disparity between Japan’s 
official policy prohibiting unskilled labor and its implementation of what he, Liu-Farrer, 
and others refer to as immigration “side-doors,” enabling unskilled laborers to work in the 
country, albeit on a temporary basis.100  Liu Farrer mentions several side-door visa types 
as examples: the entertainer visa, which allowed the majority of Filipina women to enter 
as dancers, singers, and other “skilled” entertainers; the student-trainee visa that allowed 
students from China, Vietnam, and other Asian countries to stay past their education period 
and complete internship and other training work; and finally, the Nikkeijin visas that 
allowed ethnic Japanese from South American countries such as Brazil and Peru to live 
and work in Japan101. These different visa categories are reflected in the overall 
composition of Japan’s foreign resident population. Figure 6 shows the breakdown in 
foreign resident status; as one can see, a significant percentage are allowed for the unskilled 
Technical Interns (13.1% or 378,200 out of a total of more than 2.8 million foreigners) and 
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Figure 6. Breakdown of Number of Foreign Residents by Status of 
Residence and Nationality (as of the End of December 2020)103 
A chief source of unskilled labor comes from the Technical Intern and Training 
Program (TITP), initially established in 1993 as an internship/skills transfer program for 
workers from other partner nations; in practice, TITP morphed into a source of cheap, 
unskilled labor.104   Policy reforms in 2014 expanded the TITP, doubling the visa duration 
to six years, allowing acceptance of repeat applicants, and ignoring the “training” portion 
of the policy.105  Some may argue that these side-door policies increase the total number 
of immigrants in the country, especially from those who would otherwise not be allowed 
103 Adapted from: Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Initiatives to Accept New Foreign 
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to enter under the stricter skills-based programs. However, critics note that such side-door 
policies are rife for abuse. Liu-Farrer reports human rights abuses committed against some 
Filipinos under the entertainer visa, who are often under economic duress and have limited 
options for recourse.106  Liu-Farrer goes on to say that the student-trainee visas suffer from 
similar loopholes; often, regulations on what constitutes an international student are so 
lenient that the visa program often serves as another source of unskilled labor force 
marketed as “trainees.”107  Toshihiro outlines the issues on the TITP program that enable 
worker exploitation: 
The vast majority of TITP interns are paid the minimum wage, and since 
they are not permitted to switch jobs, employers have little incentive to raise 
their pay or improve their working conditions [...] It should be added that 
trainees who are stuck in the same job for five years have very limited 
opportunities to build their skills in keeping with the program’s ostensible 
purpose.108   
Although it increased Japan’s raw immigration numbers, such side-door policies 
approved applicants only for temporary immigration, provided limited integration support 
and rights, and proved too easy to misuse, later resulting in a patchwork of reforms that do 
little to improve the current restrictive immigration policies. 
C. SUBSTITUTES FOR INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS: CIVIL 
SOCIETIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Chung observes that in the absence of a national strategy codifying Japan’s 
immigration policies and movement, both civil societies and local governments stepped in 
to provide foreign residents with needed resources for community assimilation, welfare, 
and advocacy support.109  Chung traces the necessity and rise of immigration civil societies 
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to the Zachinis, ethnic Koreans whose ancestry originates from colonial Korea.110  Chung 
states further that, partially through civic advocacy, Zainichis accrued increasing rights and 
privileges to offset the historical discrimination they faced and ensured that other, more 
recent immigrant groups also benefited from their gains. Similarly, Chiavacci determines 
that while Japan’s flawed civil society fails to directly influence the immigration policy 
process, it could indirectly impact policy discourse through effective immigration 
framing111. A large portion of immigration civic groups advocate for a more open 
immigration policy and increased foreign resident rights. However, despite the passage of 
laws such as the 1998 Nonprofit Organization (NPO) law which resulted in an increase in 
numbers and activities of pro-immigration civic action groups,112 civil societies remain a 
minor actor in immigration policymaking. 
Likewise, GOJ equally relies on local governments to establish and enact 
immigration policy and control. In fact, in 2006, the Ministry of  Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIC) depended on local governments to develop their own policy 
prescriptions to realize the MIC’s Tabunkakyousei [“Multicultural Community 
Building”/”Multicultural Existence”] ideal.113  Additionally, Kashiwazaki describes 30 
local mayors’ initiative (started in 2001) to convene and share information/best practices 
in handling and integrating large foreign populations.114  While local municipalities 
display vital initiatives in managing their local foreigner populations, the over-reliance on 
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local governments in immigration policy development results in a myriad of different 
policy implementation with varying success. 
D. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, various political and institutional limitations contribute to maintain 
Japan’s restrictive immigration policy as the status quo. Minor changes in language can 
shift the immigration discourse, restraining policy discussions on deeper migrant issues. 
GOJ’s lack of a government agency empowered with overarching authority on immigration 
policy, alongside LDP’s large party tent that sometimes prevents consensus, often result in 
a reactive policy implementations that maintain the current state of affairs and precludes 
sweeping policy changes. Finally, while both civil societies and local governments often 
advocate for pro-immigration policies and increased foreigner integration, the nature of 




The following sections examine the cultural factors that affect Japan’s immigration 
policy, specifically, how the country’s perceived cultural identities shape its immigration 
discourse. Section A first argues that Japan has an established cultural identity as an 
ethnically homogeneous nation. Additionally, Japan is historically not a country of 
immigrants, unlike places such as New Zealand, the United States, and Canada. This 
homogeneous cultural identity, shaped partly by its closed immigration history, influences 
various political and institutional actors to either pursue or continue more restrictive 
immigration policies. This homogeneous identity also results in immigration discourse that 
is sometimes more focused on the risks—security, cultural, etc.—that increased 
immigration could trigger, as opposed to focusing on its potential benefits, further 
advancing the dialogue in favor of a more restrictive policy. Second, section B asserts that 
there is a newer cultural and state identity—that of Japan as an economic and political 
world leader—which pushes the country to fall more in alignment with international norms, 
in particular with the global democratic norms promoting a more open immigration policy. 
Finally, section C concludes that the resulting clash between Japan’s two competing 
cultural identities results in a reactive and piece-meal immigration policy that fails to 
address Japan’s economic need for an increased immigrant demographic nor addresses the 
myriad of issues that immigrants in Japan face today. 
A. CULTURAL IDENTITY AS A HOMOGENEOUS NATION
Tsuda and others define Japan as a “recent country of immigration,” a country that,
unlike the United States or Canada, “do not view immigrants as part of their identity or 
past nation-building process,” and only have a small population of naturalized citizens.115  
Japan’s historical interactions with its immigrants, combined with their low immigration, 
helped reinforce Japan’s identity as a culturally and ethnically homogenous nation and 
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continued to shape their interactions with immigrants and immigration policy in general. 
The next subsection reexamines Japan’s immigration history through a cultural lens to 
better comprehend the historical context in Japan’s cultural and national identity; this is 
necessary because, as Natter emphasizes, “the national identity approach are highly 
valuable to analyze the origins and drivers of immigration policy-making regardless of a 
country’s political system.”116 
1. Immigration History through a Cultural Lens 
Throughout their history, Japan experienced minimal interactions with immigrants 
until relatively recently. Japan closed off its borders to outsiders for more than 200 years 
during the Tokugawa Shogunate (from 1633–1852) until the U.S. government forced them 
to open up for trade during Matthew Perry’s expedition. The Meiji era had only 
inconsequential immigration numbers during their rapid growth. Even while Japan 
expanded its lands before and during World War II, the resulting Korean and Taiwanese 
colonies were considered Japanese territory, and the colonized Korean and Japanese were 
considered Japanese when they immigrated to mainland Japan, even while they enjoyed 
significantly fewer rights.117   
Shin concludes that Japan used cultural homogeneity as one of the justifications for 
expanding to Korea and Taiwan (“same origin, same race”), reasoning that the colonized 
should be granted Japanese citizenship on the basis of their shared cultures. Indeed, the 
colonized Japanese citizens were forced to assimilate and were mandated to take on 
Japanese names and learn the Japanese history and language.118  Korean and Taiwanese 
subjects immigrated to Japan in the early 20th century to subsidize labor shortages and 
caused public resentment among the Japanese, resulting in anti-colonial movements, 
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including a mass protest against the colonial immigrants in 1919.119  This pre-World War 
II history proves even then what was internalized by both the Japanese state and the 
Japanese public in general: that the concept of the Japanese state and Japanese identity is 
rooted in ethnic and cultural homogeneity. This is demonstrated by the government’s 
connection of Japanese citizenship with being “Japanese”; i.e., having a similar language, 
ethnicity, and culture. The general Japanese public also shared this link to homogeneity, as 
indicated by their negative views toward Korean and Taiwanese immigrants. 
After the war, Shin comments that Korean colonial subjects—Zainichis—that 
stayed in Japan lost their Japanese citizenship, faced institutional barriers to their jobs and 
basic civil rights, and effectively turned into second-class citizens.120  Shin also notes that 
Japan enacted several laws prior to the end of the war—including the 1947 Alien 
Registration Ordnance mandating the registry of Korean and Taiwanese colonial 
immigrants—that continued to influence future Japanese immigration laws post-war. For 
example, the 1951 Immigration Control Act stripped former colonies of their Japanese 
citizenship, restricted immigration, and mandated an immigration registration system that 
foreigners “must carry at all time and thereby allow government authorities to closely 
monitor their whereabouts.”121 
The low immigration trend continued in the decades after World War II. Japan as a 
country has not experienced immigration levels similar to that of Europe, Canada, or the 
United States and has “thus has not needed to tackle its consequences.”122  Tsuda 
concludes that the Japanese government perpetuated the low levels of immigration through 
policies that have entrenched their view of “Japan as an ethnically homogeneous nation 
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that is not and never has been a country of immigration.” 123  Tsuda further argues that 
Japanese immigration policy focuses on forbidding unskilled labor, encouraging high-
skilled technical experts, and emphasizing all immigration as a temporary, with a restrictive 
path to permanent citizenship. Japan’s immigrant population hovers at only 2%, one of the 
lowest amongst the OECD nations.124  Chung asserts that many immigration laws from 
the late 1980s to the present were a reaction to labor shortages that prompted the 
government to implement initiatives that increased needed foreign labor and were not a 
result of a desire for a comprehensive immigration policy that would integrate permanent 
immigrants.125  Chung further states that immigrants under these laws fulfilled undesirable 
temporary jobs that were 3K or “Dirty, Difficult, and Dangerous;” the nature of these jobs 
may have further separated the immigrants from the general population and established 
them as undesirables, similar to the tasks they were hired to do.  A 1990s Nikkeijin 
exception allowed the explicit immigration of temporary, unskilled workers that were 
ethnically Japanese from South American countries such as Brazil and Peru.126  
Underlying these immigration policies, which focus on the temporary nature of 
immigration and the preference for ethnic Japanese, is the interest of the various political 
and institutional actors to maintain Japan’s homogenous cultural identity and prevent the 
possible threat that increased immigration poses if it was permitted to grow permanently. 
Japan’s perceived identity as an ethnically homogeneous nation, regardless of the 
veracity of this view, is also reflected in the Japanese public’s view towards immigrants 
and immigration in general. Surveys indicate that the majority of the Japanese public are 
against allowing the immigration of unskilled workers, favor a more “closed-door” 
immigration policy, are divided on whether allowing skilled workers would be beneficial 
to Japan, and oppose allowing the permanent residency of skilled or unskilled 
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immigrants.127  These same surveys also reflect the general public’s negative perceptions 
of immigrants—i.e., that increased immigration will be detrimental to Japanese employees, 
immigrants negatively contribute to the increasing crime rate—resulting in respondents 
favoring to either maintain or reduce the current levels of immigration.128 
Prominent political leaders and government agency representatives have made 
statements that, while sometimes disagreeable, only reflect their desire to maintain the 
country’s perceived homogeneous identity. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro previously 
stated that “Japanese intelligence levels were higher because of Japan’s racial Purity;” LDP 
Foreign Minister Michio disparagingly discussed the links between African Americans and 
“financial delinquency;” and even the Ministry of Justice “frequently commented that the 
existence of ethnic minorities within the Japanese society was highly undesirable and that 
foreign residents should assimilate to the point of indistinguishability.”129  Former Tokyo 
governor Ishihara Shintaro made several public comments outlining his views of 
immigrants as violent thieves and criminals,  while the National Police Agency included a 
separate section on “foreign criminality” in their public papers.130  One can infer that 
Japan’s immigration policies are motivated by the same desire to maintain Japan’s ethnic 
identity reflected in these politicians’ and agencies’ sentiments. 
In sum, Japan has historically been a closed-immigration country with an 
entrenched identity as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation. This homogeneous 
identity shapes the country’s interactions with immigration and the resulting immigration 
policies throughout its history, from the pre-war Meiji era to the present day. Specifically, 
Japan’s ethnic identity contributes to the state’s views of immigration as a negative or a 
potential threat to its homogeneity, resulting in immigration policies that seek to minimize 
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immigration numbers (by making them temporary, for example) or restrict immigration to 
those that could still meet Japan’s criteria for ethnic similarities (such as the ethnically 
Japanese Nikkejin from South America). This results in reactive immigration policies that 
fail to fully address Japan’s dynamic immigration needs.  
2. Homogeneity and Immigration Framing  
Japan’s established identity as that of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous 
nation helps shape the immigration policy through the way it frames the immigration 
discourse; in particular, this cultural identity contributes to focusing immigration 
discussions in terms of the security and cultural dangers it poses. First, immigration 
dialogue within government agencies is often framed as a security issue: Chiavacci notes 
that the Ministry of Justice itself “regards immigration policy primarily as an issue of 
guaranteeing high level of internal security and order.”131  Chiavacci also observes that 
the MOJ continues to advocate for a more “restrictive immigration policy,” for example, 
by objecting to temporary foreign programs. By simply making the connection between 
immigration and internal security issues in its white papers, the MOJ has successfully 
framed the immigration issue in a potentially pejorative manner. 
Second, as Vogt concludes, discussing immigration within the lens of “internal 
security” and “immigration control” is partly motivated by Japan’s desire to protect its 
homogeneous ethnic identity.132  Vogt infers this when she asserted that viewing 
immigration as something to control results from “defining ‘otherness,’” where “the 
potential migrant is perceived to be a threat to the national security and public safety:” in 
short, immigrants and foreigners pose a threat because of their perceived propensity to 
criminality, and maintaining lower immigration levels will result in a safer country. 
Finally, the negative views towards immigration and immigrants are reinforced 
through the media and government agencies. As stated before, the MOJ published several 
white papers that highlighted immigration as an internal security issue: their topics 
 
131 Chiavacci, “Indispensable Future Workers or Internal Security Threat?” 131–133. 
132 Vogt, “Friend and Foe: Juxtaposing Japan’s Migration Discourses,” 55–56.  
47 
included the 2014 “Campaign Against Illegal Employment of Foreigners,” the 2006 paper 
highlighting the increased number of immigrants who have broken laws, as well as a 2004 
paper highlighting visa violators as criminals that have the propensity to commit further 
crimes.133  The National Police Agency also published several papers linking immigrants 
and crimes in Japan: Chiavacchi emphasizes that much of the evidence that both MOJ and 
NPA outlined were problematic, as they were filled with calculation errors and “logical 
inconsistencies.”134  Even so, the local Japanese media furthers this narrative of 
immigrants as a danger to society, often by sensationalizing crimes committed by 
foreigners, giving the crimes lengthened exposure that far outweighs the crimes’ impact 
and frequency. Chiavacchi concludes that the Japanese newspapers’ often prejudiced 
reporting against foreign-committed crimes has negatively influenced the public’s views 
of immigrants in general; for example, there is a stronger association between foreigners 
and crimes in Japan than in other countries, and Japanese distrust of immigrants has 
increased through the years.135 
In sum, Japan’s established identity as a homogeneous nation influences its 
immigration discourse by framing increased foreigners as an internal security threat. This 
view is corroborated by different actors such as the government agencies, the Japanese 
media, prominent public officials, and the general Japanese public. The “immigration 
equals increased crimes” discourse is strengthened by the anti-immigration views of the 
different actors that are continuously circulated within the public. The state’s homogeneous 
identity and its negative immigration views get further reinforced.  
B. CULTURAL IDENTITY AS A WORLD LEADER
Japan’s second, relatively newer cultural identity as an economic and political
world leader has emerged to challenge the state’s traditional interaction with immigrants 
and immigration policy. In essence, Japan’s world leader identity encourages the state to 
pursue immigration policies that are more in line with other world leaders, such as countries 
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within the European Union and the United States. Additionally, while immigration 
remained low throughout Japan’s recent history, the permanent immigrants in Japan 
nevertheless make an impact within the Japanese identity: Chung concluded that the 
immigrants’ increasing numbers force actors to re-examine the discourse on Japanese 
national identity and immigration.136  
1. Internationalization 
Japan’s identity as a world leader and this identity’s impact on immigration policy 
cannot be separated from its efforts to meet international standards. Even during the Meiji 
Restoration, when Japan was pursuing its “Western technology, Japanese culture” slogan, 
the GOJ remained sensitive to how the international community viewed their country. 
Gurowitz states that internationalization “involves being in step with the [Western] world” 
and that Japan “should look more like their Euro-American counterparts, not only in its 
international dealings but also domestically.”137  This translates to emulating the western 
world’s more inclusive immigration policy that focuses on immigrant integration and the 
view of a nation’s multi-ethnic and multicultural makeup as a net positive.  
In Japan’s newer world leader identity focused on internationalization, Gurowitz 
states that Japan feels pressure to accept international norms: that is, to open up its 
immigration policies, accept more immigrants, and become a more multicultural 
society.138  Gurowitz concludes that much of the progress on immigration rights in Japan 
were gained as a direct result of codifying international law within the Japanese courts and 
laws.139  For instance, in 1982, Japan modified its deportation law so that it aligned with 
the international refugee treatment standards, expanded its 1979 health insurance for 
immigrants to satisfy the 1979 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, and improved the alien registration system in 1993 after an ICCPR ruling that 
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deemed several of the requirements illegal.140  Gurowitz also recounts several legal 
challenges that resulted in increased foreigner and immigrant rights; these challenges used 
Japan’s ratification of the 1995 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination to convince the Japanese courts to modify its laws and grant immigrants 
additional entitlements. 
The emergence of Japan’s international and world leader identity is not only the 
result of international pressure (through UN Covenants and other agreements), but also due 
to international pressure from internal actors such as local Japanese governments, non-
governmental organizations, and several Japanese agencies to include the Japan Business 
Federation (Keidanren), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of International Affairs 
and Communications, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. These actors 
have, at times, focused the immigration discourse on the cultural and economic advantages 
of increased immigration as well as helped reduce the “immigrants as criminals” discourse 
by alleviating the public’s reservations through integration initiatives. For instance, local 
Japanese governments have campaigned for increased “multiculturalism” or tabunkakyosei 
(literally, “existing with multiple cultures.”).141  As Kibe explains, the tanbunkakyosei 
campaign aims to develop Japan as a more multicultural society; Kibe adds that the MIC 
defines tanbunkakyosei as acknowledging that “people with different nationalities and 
ethnicities [can] live together as members of a local community by mutually recognizing 
cultural differences.”142  Kibe further explains that the multiculturalism campaign efforts 
concentrate on integrating foreign nationals through “language, education, and cultural 
exchange” programs. Meanwhile, economically-focused entities such as the Japan 
Business Federation and MITI continue to advocate for immigration policies that increase 
net immigration and attract more skilled workers. Keidanren, for example, advocates for 
an “open door immigration policy” by reforming current immigration laws and 
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implementing social changes that would “create a[more] attractive living and working 
environment for the international community in Japan.”143 
2. Conclusion 
In sum, a newer Japan Identity—that of the country as a world leader committed to 
internationalization—has emerged in recent decades to challenge Japan’s established 
identity as an ethnically homogeneous culture. Japan’s world leader identity emerged due 
to the influence of the international community, more specifically the Euro-American 
Western countries who act as norm breakers by advocating for a new immigration standard: 
that of multicultural nations committed to open immigration policies and acceptance of 
more foreigners as naturalized citizens. Other actors, including local Japanese 
governments, non-governmental organizations, and Japanese agencies, also serve as norm 
breakers by continuing to advocate for internationalization and multiculturalism as the 
new, accepted convention within the country. This competing cultural identity affects 
immigration policy discourse by shifting focus on the advantages of more open 
immigration instead of viewing it through the internal security lens. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The two divergent Japanese identities—(1) Japan as an ethnically homogeneous 
culture that seeks to maintain its restrictive immigration policy; and (2) Japan as an 
international/world leader that advocates for multiculturalism and a more open 
immigration policy—compete with each other in defining Japan’s immigration strategy. 
This contributes to a lack of comprehensive vision for the future of Japanese immigration 
and more disjointed immigration policies that sometimes produce outcomes that may be 
completely opposite of their intended results.  
For example, while Shinzo Abe’s government embraces its role as a world leader 
and seeks to restore Japan’s economic dominance, it had, until 2018, neglected to support 
policies that would significantly increase immigration and have instead opted for 
temporary solutions to the labor shortage, such as increasing the labor force by encouraging 
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more women and younger retirees to work.144 Another example is Japan’s policy to 
Nikkejins: on the one hand, allowing Nikkejins to immigrate and work in Japan shows the 
country’s willingness to adapt and open its immigration doors for unskilled workers; on 
the other hand, the focus on only unskilled workers who are ethnically Japanese suggest 
that Nikkejin policy is still driven by the government’s desire to maintain the nation’s 
perceived cultural homogeneity.145  Additionally, the disjointed immigration policies can 
be seen by the differences in what Vogt calls “policy outcome,” which is the stated intended 
result of a policy, versus “policy output,” which is the actual result of policy 
implementation.146  Examples of the “policy outcome” versus “policy output” disconnect 
include the Technical Intern Training Program (a program to encourage skilled labor but 
instead became an engine for the influx of unskilled labor) and the student visa program 
(originally intended for international students, but in practice was used as another avenue 
to temporary unskilled labor).147 
In sum, Japan currently faces an immigration policy dilemma as a result of its 
competing cultural identities. Japan’s established homogeneous identity encourages 
policies that continue Japan’s restrictive immigration norm, while Japan’s new identity as 
an international world leader encourages increased immigration and adapting 
internationalization as the norm. The result is a piece-meal immigration vision that fails to 
provide an adequate solution to the country’s demographic and economic shortages. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
This thesis sought to understand why Japan’s immigration policy remains 
restrictive and examined what factors influence immigration policymaking. It was 
organized to analyze this question by examining the three main perspectives to immigration 
policymaking: (1) economic, (2) political and institutional, and (3) cultural. While there 
are a multitude of scholarly journals that examined these immigration factors, this thesis 
also aimed to analyze how policy actors weight these factors in finalizing immigration 
policy recommendations.
This thesis first examined Japan’s immigration patterns to determine whether the 
conventional knowledge that Japan’s immigration system is closed and restrictive is 
correct. By comparing Japan’s immigration data with that of other OECD countries, this 
thesis concurred with the scholarly view that Japan lags behind its counterparts in 
immigration acceptance rates.148  It also examined more subjective measures of the 
country’s immigration trends. For example, it demonstrated that Japan’s low immigration 
numbers extended to its refugee acceptance rates and that the government showed a  
preference for temporary immigration that provided only a limited path to gain long-term 
residency.149 This thesis also argued that the lack of immigration integration support 
structure contribute to the low immigration trends  and concluded that the various data 
above provided sufficient proof that Japan’s immigration can be accurately described as 
low and restrictive. 
After providing a short overview of Japan’s immigration history for the past 30 
years, this thesis then examined the economic factors that influenced Japan’s immigration 
policy. It recognized that Japan is an outliner in terms of labor shortages and percentage of 
foreign residents, especially when juxtaposed against other comparable OECD 
148 OECD (2020), International Migration Outlook 2020 (Paris: Routledge, 2020), 26,  
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countries150. It observed a few economic actors and concluded that the majority favored 
an open, less restrictive immigration policy for Japan. However, it also concluded that 
despite their advocacy and pro-immigration stance, scholars suggested that economic 
actors do not have significant influence in the policy-making process.151  The chapter 
identified several issues, including institutional and political limitations and the disparity 
between businesses who profit and communities/governments that shoulder the cost.152  
These issues prevented powerful business organizations from sufficiently persuading the 
state to pursue more open policies. 
This thesis next explored several institutional and political factors that collectively 
contribute to keeping Japan’s closed-immigration status quo. It examined how even 
political and institutional framing—that is, the terminologies utilized during immigration 
policy deliberations—prevented immigration discourse from exploring more expansive 
issues such as extensive worker rights and paths to permanent residency or citizenship. It 
then showed different elements that contributed to a disjointed Japanese immigration 
strategy: these elements included intra-agency and intra-party disputes and vague chain-
of-command management of immigrants and immigration policy.153  It noted how the 
LDP’s long-term, single-party government rule precluded examination of more extreme 
policy proposals and influenced immigration policymaking to remain moderate while 
maintaining the status quo.154  This thesis further demonstrated Japan’s disjointed 
immigration strategy by showcasing the disparity that sometimes happens between policy 
intent and policy results, and concluded by examining how existing institutions such as 
 
150 Michael Strausz, Help (Not) Wanted: Immigration Politics in Japan (New York: SUNY Press, 
2019), loc. 222–233 of 3852, Kindle edition. 
151 David Chiavacci, “Japan as a New Immigration Country: The Gap between Immigra-tion Policy 
and Actual Immigration in International Comparison,” 81–93. 
152 Gary P. Freeman, “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,” The 
International Migration Review 29, no. 4 (1995): 881–902, https://doi.org/10.2307/254772; Chiavacci, 
“Japan as a New Immigration Country: The Gap between Immigra-tion Policy and Actual Immigration in 
International Comparison,” 85–6. 
153 David Chiavacci, “Japan as a New Immigration Country: The Gap between Immigra-tion Policy 
and Actual Immigration in International Comparison,” 88–93; Milly, “Policy Advocacy for Foreign 
Residents in Japan,” 128–131. 
154 Mike Douglass, “Global Householding and Japan - A Comparative Perspective on the Rise of a 
Multicultural Society,” 32. 
55 
civil societies and local governments often step in to provide needed immigration support 
when national government guidance is missing.155 
Finally, this thesis explored the cultural factors that affect immigration policy. It 
first concluded that Japan’s long history established and reinforced their national cultural 
identity as a homogeneous nation, influencing political and institutional actors to frame 
open immigration as a net negative and a policy to avoid. It then examined a competing 
cultural viewpoint of Japan as an economic and political leader, showing how this world-
leader narrative leads actors to pursue a more progressive immigration strategy. It 
concluded that, similar to institutional fragmentation, these competing cultural narratives 
resulted in a less unified and more disjointed immigration policy developments that did not 
move the needle towards a more robust immigration policy. 
Recent immigration policy reform enacted in late 2018 seem to point towards a 
more open immigration strategy. However, early immigration data may not provide the full 
picture due to developments with the global pandemic. It remains too early to conclude 
whether the new policy goals match the policy intent, or whether some disparity still exists, 
but this can be subject for future research. 
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